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With its four official languages\u200b,\u200b Switzerland, where most citizens identify with the Swiss \u201cnation of will\u201d, appears to have \u201csatisfied\u201d its linguistic minorities and rarely makes international headlines because of language conflicts. This success is often attributed to the absence of linguistic enclaves (except for Romansh) and the principle of territoriality. However, language freedom also plays a role along the German-French language border (Biel\/Bienne) or in Graub\u00fcnden, where the decline of Romansh is hard to stop. And some heated legal debates have taken place particularly in multilingual cantons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition, the \u201clanguage peace\u201d can be linked to pragmatism and non-intervention. Even without legal protection, Swiss German dialects are very much alive, in a stable diglossic relationship with standard German. But Switzerland\u2019s flattering image seems misleading in regards to its \u201cfifth language\u201d \u2013 Francoproven\u00e7al. The country has not done much better than centralist France in protecting this age-old language. Its recent inclusion in the debate on the implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages offers some perspectives of revitalization, as does the proactive policy of the cantons of Fribourg and Valais, but this minimal legal protection comes very late.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Canada is a federal country. Canadian federalism is the result of a political compromise between its two main groups, Anglophones and Francophones. It language regime is also informed by political compromise. Because of federalism, language is ancillary in Canada. All governments can adopt their own language policies. As a result, Quebec has its own language policies as well as all the other provinces and territories except for British-Columbia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This paper will discuss language policy-choices at the federal level. It will explain how such compromise has informed four generations of language policies. It will present briefly these different generations and their main characteristics. It will focus on the government\u2019s new proposed legislation to modernize its Official Languages Act (Bill C-13). It will discuss its key points and show how it is continuing Canada\u2019s language compromise while trying to propose change. The paper will conclude by explaining why it is important to look at patterns of continuity and change in the study of language regimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Belgian state is a federal state, bringing together three national linguistic communities (Dutch, French and German speakers). Its linguistic organisation is part of a \u2018model of plurilingualism\u2019; based on three principles of freedom, equality and territoriality. These characters are translated into the law – sometimes very imperfectly – with the freedom of language, the linguistic regions (principle of territoriality) and an institutional organization that puts the (two main) linguistic communities on an equal footing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this contribution, I will argue that the Belgian language regime has two critical weaknesses. First, the freedom of language is interpreted restrictively under the principle of linguistic territoriality. Second, there is a lack of formal recognition of the plurilingualism of the Belgian state. The former is a matter of legal interpretation, while the latter stems from silence in the law. These elements make it possible to say that the law is undoubtedly necessary to carry out a linguistic policy that ensures linguistic pacification but cannot be seen as sufficient.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Panel chair: Juan Jim\u00e9nez-Salcedo Is Switzerland as language-friendly as its reputation suggests? Prof. Dr. Manuel Meune With its four official languages\u200b,\u200b Switzerland, where most citizens identify with the Swiss \u201cnation of will\u201d, appears to have \u201csatisfied\u201d its linguistic minorities and … Continue reading